The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employed the Reagan Doctrine in such hot spots as Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Ethiopia. This policy worked well in Afghanistan, where U.S.-backed mujahideen guerrilla fighters inflicted heavy losses on Soviet forces and the Kremlin experienced a Vietnam-style quagmire of its own. In Angola, the anti-communist rebels became a liability for the Reagan administration as they destroyed U.S. oil facilities and accepted support from South Africa's apartheid regime. Meanwhile, the Angolan government increasingly cooperated with U.S. oil companies and investors.
The Reagan Doctrine received the greatest attention in Central America. The United States helped train and equip a 17,000-man Salvadoran army to wage a counterinsurgency against a guerrilla force roughly a quarter its size. The slaughtering of political opponents and a rigged election compelled U.S. officials to install a moderate government that ultimately failed to bring peace or democracy to El Salvador.
In Nicaragua, the Reagan White House championed the Contras, who were fighting against the revolutionary socialist Sandinista regime. Reagan likened the Contras to America's "founding fathers" despite reports of atrocities committed in their name. Washington authorized CIA training for Contras and the construction of military bases in neighboring Honduras to facilitate rebel operations. In 1983 the CIA mined Nicaraguan ports and launched clandestine attacks on oil facilities and airports. Congress suspended military aid to the Contras in 1984, which prompted Reagan officials to explore covert avenues of assistance and to solicit private donations.
A preoccupation with applying the Reagan Doctrine to Nicaragua dovetailed with U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In 1985, White House officials used Israelis as intermediaries to secretly supply military hardware to the Iranian government in the hope of securing the release of fifteen Americans held hostage in the region. This pipeline operated for fourteen months, during which time a few captives were released and other people were kidnapped. In November 1986 the story of the arms-for-hostages deal broke in the American press. President Reagan was compelled to admit to attempts made to influence those whom he called "moderates" in the Iranian government. The Central American connection emerged three weeks later when U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese disclosed that the proceeds from the Iranian arms sales had been clandestinely diverted to the Contras in violation of the 1982 Boland Amendment, which had banned any spending for the overthrow of the Sandinista government.
In 1987 Congress held hearings into what the media dubbed the Iran-Contra Affair, with Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a National Security Council aide, emerging as the star witness. North vigorously defended the Reagan Doctrine despite having admitted to illegally shredding government documents and misleading Congress. Eleven members of the Reagan administration pled guilty or were convicted of charges stemming from the Iran-Contra Affair. Reagan claimed ignorance of the financial conduit to the Contras. The Reagan Doctrine aimed to avoid another Vietnam but ultimately became associated with the sort of executive branch deception and hubris that had made that war so controversial.
Jeffrey D. Bass
Further Reading
Scott, James. Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.
